Judgment Proofmg: A Rejoinder
Steven L. Schwarcz*
Professors LoPucki and Mooney have responded to my article, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing,l and I have been granted the opportunity to write a short rejoinder. Given page limitations and the fact that
Professor Mooney and I are in agreement on the fundamentals, I discuss only
Professor LoPucki's response.2 Both that response and my rejoinder follow
my analytical approach of dividing judgment proof structures into two categories: arm's length and non-arm's length.
My central points are straightforward. I don't claim that judgment
proofing never will occur, merely that it is unlikely to cause, in LoPucki's
words, the "death ofliability." Ann's length judgment proofing transactions
are unlikely because they necessarily require the assistance of an independent company. However, the costs to the independent company are apt to exceed any benefits to the judgment proofed company. As a matter of social
psychology, the independent company also will be risk averse in assessing
those costs) NonMarm's length judgment proofing transactions, on the other
hand, are not always subject to the same real or perceived costs, and therefore are more likely to occur. But non-arm's length judgment proofing is not
new~the legal system historically has imposed a range of restrictions that
tend to discourage it. Empirical data suggest that these restrictions are sufficient; to the extent they become insufficient, the law is likely to evolve additional restrictions as necessary.
The remainder of this rejoinder responds to LoPucki's more detailed
comments.
• Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, and Faculty Director, Duke University
Global Capital Markets Center. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. The author thanks Stewart J.
Schwab, Daniel B. Schwarcz, and Paul M. Shupack for helpful comments on a draft of this Article
and Daniel M. Bronski for research assistance.
1. 52 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Inherent Irrationality]. The responses are Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Irrefotable Logic ofJudgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 55 (1999) [hereinafter Irrefotable Logic] and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Judgment Proofing,
Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. REv. 73 (1999).
2. LoPucki, by his own admission, responds to only some of my arguments. See Irrefotable
Logic, supra note 1, at 55 (stating that "[t]he sheer number of [Schwarcz's] arguments makes it
impossible for me to respond to all of them"). My rejoinder follows that limited response.
3. Even though the independent company's costs cannot be precisely quantified, that very uncertainty increases its perception of the risk. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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I. ARM's LENGTH JUDGMENT PROOFING

Professor LoPucki argues that asset securitization is a "dangerous" new
judgment proofing technique,4 comparing it to "the invention of a new tool
that makes burglary easier."5 That argument fails for three reasons. As I
pointed out6 and LoPucki himself admits,7 securitization itself does not cause
judgment proofing. Rather, judgment proofing would require an independent
and unrelated disposition of assets to shareholders,s which could occur without securitization.9 Secondly, even if one were to argue that securitization
generates cash proceeds which could be paid to shareholders more easily, I
have shown that no one will invest in a securitization where the company
obligated for repayment makes itself judgment proof by disposing of the invested proceeds.l O Indeed, the more nefarious that company is, the less
likely that investors will trust it to perform its repayment obligation. Finally,
LoPucki's comparison fails ab initio because a tool that makes burglary more
efficient may have no legitimate uses, whereas securitization has a wide
range of beneficial uses. The possible misuse of a beneficial tool should not
undermine its legitimacy. Even a computer, for example, might be used as a
burglary to 01. 11 It makes burglary easier by enabling the burglar to track his
successful break-ins and sales to third-party fences. Indeed, LoPucki himself
argues that computers are the ultimate engines behind much judgment
proofing. Computers, however, have other uses than burglary (or judgment
proofing), and burglaries (and judgment proofing) can occur without computers. The possibility that a good tool can be used to make it easier to perform a bad action does not prove that the tool is bad. The key question is
whether the dangers of misuse of the tool-whether computers or securitization-outweigh the beneficial uses.
LoPucki also claims, without citing any authority, that the "common
consequence" of securitization is "reduction in the operating entity's (Fl's)
ratio of assets to liability risk."12 That claim, however, is not only wrong but
may be irrelevant. It is wrong because that ratio could not decrease without
4. See id. at 56.
5.Id.
6. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 12-15.
7. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 56.
8. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 16 & n.73.
9. See id. at 18.
10. See id. at 14 & n.6I, wherein I conclude that "the likelihood that F2 would be able to obtain securitization or other financing on the strength of a lease to FI is extremely remote. Few
investors or bank lenders would be willing to take the risk that future rentals of a judgment proof
lessee [FI] would be paid." For this very reason, LoPucki's use of an assetless F2 to argue that
judgment proofing will not expose F2's assets to claims of FI's creditors or that F2 will not subject
to reputational costs appears to be umealistic. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 64-66.
11. I thank Stewart Schwab for this analogy.
12. Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 56.
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the disposition of assets to shareholders, a disposition that, if it occurs, would
be independent of the securitization transaction.I 3 In fact, the common consequence of a securitization is to leave that ratio unchanged.I 4 LoPucki's
claim also would be irrelevant if, notwithstanding a reduced ratio of assets to
liabilities, sufficient assets remain to enable Fl to pay its liabilities.I s
LoPucki then focuses away from securitization onto more fundamental
issues, questioning first my observation that the company wishing to judgment-proof itself (FI) receives equivalent value in return.I 6 In that context,
he disagrees that a transfer of assets to pay creditors would be the antithesis
of judgment proofing. His rationale is that payment of voluntary creditors,
such as bank lenders, could prejudice involuntary creditors, such as tort
creditors, if the debtor is ultimately insolvent)7 That may be so, but it is irrelevant. Preferential payment by an insolvent company always could prejudice remaining creditors, which is precisely why bankruptcy law avoids such
preferential payments.I 8 Finally, he alleges that my core statement-that a
13. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
14. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCfURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION 2 (2d ed. 1993) (illustrating balance sheet impact of securitization); if a
company sells its receivables, the ratio of assets to liabilities remains unchanged, and if the company also uses the sale proceeds to pay down debt, the ratio would actually improve).
15. In another context, LoPucki has referred to a reduction of a company's ratio of assets to
potential liabilities as "a kind of soft judgment proofing." Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment
Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1430 (1998) (emphasis added). By his definition and
mine, however, such a reduction would not be actual judgment proofing-even "soft" judgment
proofing-unless the reduction is sufficient to deny a creditor recovery of a portion of its claim.
See id. at 1421; Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 2 n.2. LoPucki also attempts to find significance in my "dropping the word 'asset' from the phrase 'asset securitization.'" Irrefotable Logic,
supra note 1, at 56-57. I intended nothing-the phrases are interchangeable. See, e.g., HAL S.
SCOTT & PmLIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 751 (5th ed. 1998) (using those phrases interchangeably). Professor LoPucki sums up his
argument that securitization is a judgment proofing technique with strong rhetoric: "Even if correct, Schwarcz's argument for the 'legitimacy' of asset securitization in no way refutes my thesis.
Liability will be just as dead whether it dies from 'asset securitization' or asset securitization followed by a typical disposition of proceeds." Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 57 (footnotes omitted). However, the first conclusion doesn't follow because I have shown, and LoPucki indeed has
conceded, that asset securitization itself cannot cause judgment proofing. See id. at 56. The second
conclusion doesn't follow because it incorrectly assumes that asset securitization is typically followed by a disposition of proceeds. LoPucki attempts to justify that assumption by referring to
examples of possible proceeds dispositions. See id. at 58 n.17. However, but the fact that a disposition is possible says nothing about whether it is typical.
16. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 57-59.
17. See id. at58.
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1999) (avoiding such transfers, and providing that avoided payments
be retumed to the debtor's estate for equal and ratable distribution to all creditors). A company's
payments to voluntary creditors sometimes might tum out, in retrospect, to precede the prebankruptcy preference period. Those payments then would not be avoidable as preferential under
existing law. To the extent this becomes problematic, preference law could be amended to extend
the preference period. Where there is actual intent to make those payments for the pwpose of
judgment proofing, the payments also may be able to be avoided as fraudulent transfers under federal and state laws, which have longer statutes oflimitation. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l) (1993
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transfer of assets to unrelated third parties should not cause judgment proofing because no rational company will give away its assets without demanding equivalent value in return-is "true on its face, but misleading in context."19 His rationale appears unresponsive to my statement, however, since
he refers only to third party creditors and shareholders whereas I refer to
third parties "other than creditors and owners [shareholders]."2o
Next, LoPucki claims that I don't quantitatively prove that the costs of
judgment proofing necessarily outweigh its benefits.21 All observers, however, know that the costs and benefits of judgment proofing cannot be precisely quantified, at least with our current data and understanding.22 Indeed,
the uncertainty that results from the inability to quantify these amounts
makes it inherently risky for F2 to assist in Fl's judgment proofing. Moreover, in an arm's length context, F2 will be risk averse and therefore prone to
exaggerate these risks.23 F2 is therefore unlikely to expose itself to liability
by assisting in Fl's judgment proofmg.
The inability to quantify these amounts also raises the issue of burden of
proof. If it seems (based on LoPucki's arguments, intuition, and modeling)
that the new financial tools he complains of lead to a major danger of judgment proofing, then the burden is on those promoting those tools to demonstrate that danger is clearly outweighed by benefits. On the other hand, if it
seems (based on arguments, modeling, and intuition that I have tried to articulate) that the dangers of those tools are exaggerated and their benefits are
large, then the burden should be on those proposing regulation.
Professor LoPucki also suggests that I fail to take into account that different companies have different potential amounts ofliability.24 To the contrary, however, I show that even the possibility of large mass tort claim liability would not necessarily increase the amount of value that judgment
& Supp. 1999) (authorizing avoidance of payments made, within one year prior to ban1<ruptcy, with
"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" any creditor); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr §§
4(a)(I), 9(a) (1984) (authorizing avoidance of payments made within past four years or, if later,
within one year after the payment was or could reasonably have been discovered by the complaining creditor, with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor"). If these longer statutes
of limitation are still insufficient, they likewise could be extended, as has occurred in the past when
"experience has demonstrated" that an extension is needed to avoid fraudulent activities. 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 548.02[2], at 548-26 (15th ed. 1996).
19. Irrefutable Logic, supra note 2, at 59.
20. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note I, at 16 (emphasis added).
21. See Irrefutable Logic, supra note 1, at 59-67.
22. LoPucki himself is aware that these costs and benefits cannot be precisely quantified.
Letter from Lynn M. LoPucki to Steven L. Schwarcz 5 (Oct. 19, 1998) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
23. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note I, at 26-27 (discussing prospect theory and the social psychology of voluntary risk-taking).
24. See Irrefutable Logic, supra note I, at 60 (stating that Schwarcz's argument fails to account for the variation among companies "in their liability risks and judgment proofing costs").
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proofing is expected to take from creditors.2s That amount is inherently limited by the amount of the company's assets. 26 Thus, an increase in a company's tort liability actually may deter judgment proofing because the liability of companies assisting in the judgment proofing is not so limited.27 Additionally, he argues that I omit from my calculation three possible benefits
to Fl, the judgment proofing entity: That the devices used for judgment
proofing provide economic benefit even when they are not used for judgment
proofing, so judgment proofing is purely a bonus; that judgment proof companies can engage in high tort risk activity with impunity; and that judgment
proofing eliminates the cost of risk management.2 8 However, his focus on
Fl's benefits obscures the fact that F2 will be unlikely to engage in the
judgment proofing transaction in the first place.
Moreover, those benefits appear marginal at best. For example, his argument that judgment proofing is purely a bonus suggests that many of the
costs referred to in my analysis would be incurred anyway by engaging in an
economically beneficial securitization transaction. But that suggestion is
misleading because my analysis does not purport to include securitization
transaction costs. Also, his argument that judgment proof companies can
engage in high tort risk activity ,vith impunity appears unrealistic. He hypothesizes a company that considers a series of business opportunities sequentially, each opportunity having a "a 50% chance of a net gain of 100
and ... a 50% chance of a net loss of 200."29 A non-judgment proof company '\vill decline to pursue the opportunities because [its] expected return
from each opportunity [is] a loss of 50."30 In contrast, he argues, "[i]f the
same firm could become judgment proof by shedding its assets and remain
judgment proof by distributing any gains to shareholders before undertaking
the next opportunity, the firm would pursue all the opportunities" because it
then benefits from the chance of gain but, being judgment proof, avoids the
risk ofloss.3 1 Thus, he concludes, the "gains from judgment proofing are not
... merely the gains from protecting the debtor's finite assets [but] are gains
from the extemalization of liability."32 That seems unlikely, however. As
soon as the judgment proof company faces a loss, which is the immediately
25. See Inherent Irrationality. supra note 1, at 49.
26. See id.
27. Seeid. at 50.
28. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 62.
29.Id.
30.Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (responding to my argument that the gain from judgment proofing a company is limited to the value of the company's assets absent judgment proofing). At another point in his analysis, after admitting in a footnote that my argument would be correct, he conjectures, without basis,
that I "apparently contemplate[ ]" an assumption that makes my argument wrong. Irrefotable
Logic, supra note 1, at 61 n.36. In North Carolina, we would call his conjecture "chutzpah"!
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likely scenario in LoPucki's hypothetical, it will be insolvent and unable to
pay its debts as they come due, virtually leading to bankruptcy)3 Bankruptcy judges are unlikely to condone further tortious undertakings, and thus
the judgment proof company will not have more than one bite at the externalizing-torts revenue apple. Moreover, parties will not blindly enter into
negative present value transactions with judgment proof companies. Survivors in the rough and tumble of business transactions are far too savvy to
become the willing victims of externalized liability. To the extent externalization occurs, it therefore will be limited to involuntary parties (such as tort
creditors), who are most likely to be protected by the bankruptcy judge.
Finally, LoPucki claims that I overstate the costs of arm's length judgment proofing by assuming that when an otherwise viable company owes
debt in excess of its ability to pay, liquidation is likely to result.34 For "large
public company bankruptcies," he counters, the ordinary outcome is for the
fIrm to discharge its tort debt in bankruptcy while continuing its operations.35
True, but large public companies are least likely to attempt to judgmentproof themselves,36 whereas small companies ordinarily liquidate in bankruptcy.37 Indeed, "[t]he most common type ofbanlauptcy case [for all companies] is a liquidation bankruptcy case."38 LoPucki responds by arguing
that "[d]eliberately judgment-proofed fIrms are the type least likely to liquidate in bankruptcy" because "[t]ypically their distress will be the result of
tort debt that exceeds their assets, that is, financial distress [as opposed to an
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (pennitting creditors to force a company into involuntary bankruptcy
under these conditions). This assumes the judgment proof company engages in the transaction,
which itself is questionable because "corporate law should, and indeed under existing law already
may, impose on directors of a corporation a fiduciary duty to creditors as well as shareholders when
a risky venture is reasonably expected to prejUdice creditors." Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinlang
Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEx. L. REv. 515, 589-90 (1999) (citations
omitted).
34. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 63.
35. Seeid.
36. Large public companies, for example, would have the highest reputational costs. See
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,39-40 (1996) (explaining why large
companies are much less likely to be judgment proof than small and medium size companies); id. at
89 (concluding that "[f]or most large firms, the costs of judgment proofing still exceed the benefits").
37. See DAVID G. EpSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 10-2, at
734-35 (1993) (observing that although the Chapter 11 cases of most small businesses are converted
to Chapter 7 liquidations, "[o]n the contrary, the Chapter 11 of a big business [to which a State is
closer in analogy] usually leads to some form of reorganization"; and specUlating that the distinction might arise from the fact that "[m]any of the small Chapter 11 's [sic] belonged in Chapter 7
from the beginning and never had any hope of a successful reorganization," and because of
"economies of scale, a large business can bear [the cost ofa Chapter 11 case] more readily than a
small one"). See also Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11,102 YALE
L.J. 437, 443 (1992) (observing that "[o]nIy about 17% of all Chapter 11 cases manage to confirm a
plan of reorganization").
38. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (1997). Discharge is not available
to a liquidating company. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(I), (a)(2) (1999).
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inherently bad business]."39 Other things being equal, a company with an
inherently good business would indeed be a good candidate for reorganization, even though it may have financial distress. But other things are not
equal if the company has deliberately judgment-proofed itself. A bankruptcy
judge then is unlikely to allow the company to reorganize,40 much less to
discharge its tort debt,41 in bankruptcy.
I do not assert, however, that there never will be industries where liability is so unpredictable and potentially so large and reputation costs so small
that one might expect to see judgment proofing efforts. LoPucki himself
refers to judgment proofing in the New York City taxicab industry, of which
I am aware.42 Yet the law's evolution recently has limited judgment proofing even in that context, such as by greatly increasing the amount of liability
insurance coverage that taxicab owners must maintain43 and by making taxicab medallion owners responsible for the leased operation of their cabs.44
39. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 64.
40. The Code specifically prohibits confirmation of a reorganization plan that has not been
proposed in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1993). Furthermore, where a Chapter 11 case has
not been filed in good faith, the bankruptcy judge has discretion to convert it to Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1993 & Supp. 1999) (for cause, permitting conversion to Chapter 7 or
dismissal of the case, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and of the estate). See also
MARK S. SCARBERRY, KENNETH N. KLEE, GRANT W. NEWTON & STEVE H. NICKLES, BUSiNESS
REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 944 (1996) (referring to lack of good faith as an "unstated
'cause' for purposes of[§ 1112(b)]").
41. II U.S.C. § 1141(d) provides, in relevant part, that confirmation of a plan discharges the
debts of a debtor reorganizing under a Chapter 11 plan, except as otherwise provided in the order
confirming the plan. The rationale for permitting a discharge, nonvithstanding fraudulent acts on
the debtor's part, is that "[w]hatever wrongful acts may have been committed by those in charge of
the business in the past, it will do the creditors no good to deny the debtor a discharge-after the
reorganization they likely will own all or a substantial part of the debtor's business, and a denial of
discharge would harm their interests." SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 40, at 957. But if the reorganizing debtor remains, for whatever reason, under the control of the defrauding person(s), a court
could decide to disallow discharge. The situation then would be analogous to that of a fraudulent
individual debtor who uses Chapter 11 to reorganize. Even though such a debtor, technically under
§ 1141(d), could receive a discharge, "that is not likely to happen." Id. at 958. The judge, instead,
is "likely to dismiss the case, to convert it to chapter 7 [liquidation], or to deny confirmation of the
debtor's plan." Id.
42. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 61 n.33.
43. NEW YORK, N.Y., Tit 35, ch. 1, § 1-40 (1998) (stating that taxi owners must maintain
coverage in an amount "not less than $200,000 per person").
44. See Karlin v. H & L Maintenance, No. 97 CV. 2551, 1997 WL 720769 (E.D.N.Y. Oct 1,
1997) (holding a medallion owner liable for damages to a passenger caused by a lessee operating
the cab). LoPucki also suggests that "[c]urrent events in the tobacco industry," such as spinoffs of
subsidiaries and divisions, illustrate judgment proofing in that industry. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment
Proofing: A Rejoinder. supra note 15, at 1430-31. However, spinoffs intended for judgment
proofing or that would have the effect of denying creditors recovery of their claims (or a portion
thereof) could be voidable under fraudulent conveyance law and might expose directors to liability.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking A Corporation's Obligation to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv.
647, 678 & 679 n.133 (1996). Thus, RJR Nabisco's board of directors recently refused to spin off
its non-tobacco business-a result demanded by shareholder Carl Icahn in order to eliminate the
legal taint of tobacco on the conglomerate's food assets. Suein L. Hwang & Paul M. Sherer, RJR
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ll. NON-ARM's LENGTH JUDGMENT PROOFING
Professor LoPucki and I agree that, at least theoretically, this type of
judgment proofing is more likely to occur than ann's length judgment
proofing. We disagree, however, on whether it is in fact likely to occur.
LoPucki claims that computerization will make the logistics of judgment
proofing easier and cheaper by helping to keep track of assets transferred
among members of a corporate group and lowering the transaction costs of
maintaining elaborate corporate structures.4S But that claim is irrelevant to
my argument. I have shown that non-ann's length strategies are merely examples of the ancient strategy of distributing one's assets to shareholders in
preference to creditors.46 Computerization will not change that strategy.
Furthermore, because I assign no costs to the types of logistical factors that
computerization can facilitate, my analysis already implicitly assumes computerization. Computerization, on the other hand, cannot reduce the legal
liabilities47 which I argue provide the real deterrent to judgment proofing.
LoPucki also argues that one can conceive of judgment proofing transactions that might not be precisely restricted under existing law. I never
claimed otherwise, however.48 Rather, I have shown that "where existing
legal doctrines do not clearly cover judgment proofing, it is but a short step
conceptually to apply those doctrines to it."49 For example, there is a '''lib-

Nabisco to Shed Tobacco Business, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1999, at A3. The directors apparently
were concerned that the spinoff might subject them to personal liability, notwithstanding Icahn's
presentation of a legal opinion from the law firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan that the proposed
spinoff would not constitute a fraudulent conveyance under existing law. See Proxy Statement of
RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. 3 (Mar. 25, 1999); Proxy Statement of High River Limited Partnership 4 (Apr. 8, 1999). Instead, the board decided to spin off the domestic tobacco business, a strategy that does not purport to separate potential tobacco liabilities from the non-tobacco business.
See Nabisco Holdings Corp., Form 8-K Current Report 3 (June 14, 1999).
45. See I"efotable Logic, supra note 1, at 68.
46. See Inherent I"ationality, supra note 1, at 50 n.264.
47. Including tax consequences.
48. I do show, however, that the more typical forms of non-arm's length judgment proofing
are restricted under current law. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 31 & n.157 (discussing
the application of the Eastgroup Properties case to "a judgment proofing structure that resembles
this article's generic FI-F2-F3 structure").
49. Id. at 47. LoPucki himself acknowledges that "[t]hinking hypothetically and in the abstract, probably most courts would gladly extend Schwarcz's eight theories to strike down" judgment proofing. I"efotable Logic, supra note 1, at 69. But he then asserts that courts ultimately
would refuse to extend those theories to sophisticated judgment proofing transactions because to do
so would undermine "the very engines of the American economy." Id. He does not, however,
expand on this rhetoric. In my experience, courts are not at all reluctant to apply their sense of
justice to undermine sophisticated business transactions. See, e.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs.,
214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to dismiss the collusive filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions intended to stop mortgage foreclosure, in order to preserve value of bankruptcyremote special purpose entities for limited partners and unsecured creditors; and thereby undermining a sophisticated bankruptcy-remote structure supporting over $277 million of mortgage-
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eral' trend toward allowing substantive consolidation to prevent harm caused
by 'the widespread use of interrelated corporate structures.'''50 Tort theories
also could be used to impose punitive damages. Moreover, the officers and
directors of the companies involved in judgment proofing, as well as those
companies themselves, might be subject to RICO, which not only would allow creditors of a judgment proofed company to recover treble damages and
the costs of their lawsuits but also would impose criminal liability.51 Because RICO already has been applied in a wide range of commercial cases,
creditors injured in a judgment proofing are likely to claim a RICO violation. 52 And regardless of whether a RICO claim ultimately will be successful, its stigma and the fact that it may be asserted against the individuals involved as well as the companies is likely to have a significant deterrent effect. 53
ill.

CONCLUSION

In an arm's length context, the risks inherent in judgment proofing and

F2's propensity to exaggerate those risks make it unlikely that F2 \vill assist
in Fl's judgment proofing. Although non-arm's length judgment proofing is
theoretically plausible, it has long been restricted by law. Professor LoPucki
claims that computerization \vill facilitate non-arm's length judgment proofing, but computerization cannot reduce the legal restrictions which provide
the real deterrent. While LoPucki argues that one can conceive of judgment
proofing transactions that might not be precisely restricted under existing
law, I show that existing legal doctrines easily could be extended to cover
those transactions.
I agree, however, with Professor LoPucki's conclusion that no "structural impediment to judgment proofing exists in law."54 Indeed, I have argued not only that no such impediment is necessary but that such an impediment would be harmful because of its potential to "indiscriminately restrict
the value creation ... that comes \vith business and financial innovation."55

backed securities, arranged by the preeminent firm of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation).
50. Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 37 (quoting In re Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R.
820,828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). This type of an overall liberal trend is illustrated, for example,
by Karlin v. H & L Maintenance, No. 97 CV. 2551, 1997 WL 720769 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1997)
(holding a medallion owner liable for damages caused by a leased taxicab).
51. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 43 & n.229.
52. See id. at 43-44 & n.233.
53. See id. at46-47.
54. Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 71.
55. Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 53.

